Safety School Pt 2
I Forgot the Most Important Thing I Learned
Last week, I discussed my accident investigator training at the Air Force Safety School. Over the weekend, I realized I forgot to mention two very important (to me) items from the school that changed a lot about how I thought about flying.
One long-term benefit was that as a squadron safety officer, I received the final reports of all Class A accidents. If you remember, a Class A incident is one that resulted in the loss of life or an aircraft.
Every accident report had nuggets to reams of information on how a mission could go wrong.
I also learned that the Air Force required a 15% safety margin for every aircraft performance and flying limit. That idea set my math-focused brain on fire! Here are a couple of examples.
The F-16A had an absolute max airspeed of 800 knots indicated airspeed (kias). Some quick math suggests the F-16 would be safe to fly up to 920 knots! I never got close to the 800 KIAS official limit, let alone test the safety buffer.
However, we also had a limit of 550 kias when loaded with bombs. 550 plus 15% equals 632.5 knots. There definitely were missions, flying low level and avoiding “bad guys,” that I exceeded 550 knots with a load of bombs. Knowing I had that cushion let me fly more aggressively, and at least in my mind, still safely.
A gruesome story combines both of these Safety School concepts.
An accident report crossed my desk describing the loss of an F-16 and its pilot. It was a shocker!
Here are the pertinent details.
The accident took place off the coast of Florida. The pilot was in a clean (no tanks or racks) F-16, possibly an FCF mission.
At a low altitude over the water, the pilot accelerated to what the accident board calculated as 1,060 kias. 1,060 nautical miles per hour!
When the pilot pulled the throttle out of afterburner, the engine exploded.
The pilot managed to eject at an estimated 600 knots.
The forces of ejecting at that speed broke both the arms and both legs of the pilot.
In the water, he was unable, due to injuries, to deploy the life preserver attached to his harness.
The pilot’s actions were totally irresponsible, and he paid the ultimate price. He did prove the theory that an F-16 would accelerate until it blew up.
The main recommendation from the accident board was to develop an emergency flotation that would deploy automatically if a pilot ended up in the water.
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